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In recent years stakeholder participation has become a popular topic in flood
management. Little is known about how and under which circumstances local
stakeholders initiate and develop successful flood management strategies and how
governmental actors respond to them. Drawing on theories of social movements,
stakeholder participation, and citizenship, this paper analyses how local stakeholder
initiatives in the Dutch ‘Room for the River’ programme evolve and, in turn, influence
such governmental plans and actions. The description and comparative analysis of the
three cases leads to three conclusions: first, in all cases, forms of local self-
organization play a role, but its impacts are highly dependent on the mix of strategies
chosen. Second, forms of coproduction between local stakeholders and government
actors are the most viable strategy to realize the positive impact of local initiatives.
Third, government agencies tend to react to local initiatives defensively. Much
depends on timing and connecting to the right people.
Keywords: flood management; stakeholders; impact; citizen initiatives; governance
1. Introduction
The threat of climate change and its impacts on a lowland country like the Netherlands
have put flood risk management upfront on the political agenda. New strategies, policies
and interventions to increase flood-preparedness require sometimes radical interventions
in the life-worlds of citizens (Marshall, Blackstock, and Dunglinson 2010; Nye, Tapsell,
and Twigger-Ross 2011; Roth and Winnubst 2009; Van Buuren, Edelenbos, and Warner
2012; Hartmann and Spit 2015). To deal with these challenges, Dutch water management
has gradually shifted from exclusively top-down interventions towards, often hesitant and
inconsistent, experimentations with more inclusive and participatory approaches. In other
countries, stakeholder engagement and participation have also become increasingly
important in flood risk management (Chess and Purcell 1999; Koontz 2005; Thaler and
Levin-Keitel 2015; House 1999; Leach and Pelkey 2001; Leach 2006; Rinaudo and Garin
2005; Petts and Brooks 2006; Scholz and Stiffel 2005; Sabatier et al. 2005; Abbas et al.
2014), By involving citizens, NGOs and societal groups, public decision-makers hope to
enhance support for their decisions, and thus to accelerate decision-making processes.
Moreover, participation can enhance both the quality and democratic legitimacy of policy
processes and decisions (Michels 2011; Lupo Stanghellini and Collentine 2008).
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However, experiments with stakeholder engagement often do not immediately yield
the results initially hoped for, due to various barriers (Tseng and Penning-Rowsell 2012).
In general, flood risk management is a strongly expert-dominated policy domain. Within
the world of civil engineers, stakeholder engagement is often seen as a threat to decisive
and uncompromised action, which is deemed necessary to prepare for serious crises
(Warner 2006). It is sometimes even seen “to contribute to the problem rather than to add
in the solution” (Pearce 2003, 218).
Although there is literature focusing on pressure group, or interest group, strategies (e.g.
Kollman 1998; Binderkrantz 2005), the literature on flood risk management and climate
adaptation does not pay much attention to bottom-up stakeholder initiatives that evolve in
the shadow of formal decision-making processes, especially with regard to the impact of
these initiatives on flood risk management strategies. Most attention is paid to forms of
stakeholder engagement organized by the government, which sets the conditions (rules,
roles, phase, instruments, etc.) under which such engagement can take place. Recently,
however, Thaler and Levin-Keitel (2015) have described upcoming bottom-up initiatives in
the context of a high level of self-responsibility in flood risk management in England.
Controversial proposals from the government may meet with fierce resistance by local
stakeholders and provoke the latter to develop bottom-up strategies to defend their values
and interests (Nye, Tapsell, and Twigger-Ross 2011). In the Netherlands, we also see such
self-initiated stakeholder engagement (Van Buuren, Edelenbos and Klijn 2010). However,
we still know little about forms of stakeholder engagement that are not initiated and
controlled by the government. Moreover, we know little about how, and under which
circumstances, local stakeholders manage to develop, how governmental actors respond to
them and to what extent these new forms of engagement have effect and impact.
In this paper, we analyse the issue of local stakeholder engagement in the context of
the Dutch ‘Room for the River’ programme (Warner, Van Buuren, and Edelenbos 2012),
which aims at reducing flood risk by enlarging the water discharge capacity of the main
Dutch rivers, while enhancing ‘spatial quality’ (Room for the River 2012). Using three
cases of Room for the River interventions (see below), we analyse how local stakeholder
initiatives evolve (in reaction to planned government interventions) and, in turn,
importantly influence such governmental plans and actions.
The following research question guides this paper: How did stakeholder engagement
develop in flood risk management projects in the Netherlands, what kind of responses
from governmental actors did this evoke, and what does this imply in terms of the
conditions under which stakeholder engagement can have impact in flood risk
management? This question is answered by analysing and comparing three cases of
regional flood risk management in the Netherlands, all based on qualitative research. In
Section 2, we elaborate our analytical framework and its core elements, and address the
methodological aspects regarding our research. In Section 3, we provide background
information on our cases. In Section 4, we analyse the cases regarding our core variables.
We end our paper with four more generic conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework and methodology
2.1. The rise of stakeholder engagement
Within a more general trend towards new forms of democratic governance we see all
kinds of initiatives to encourage the engagement of stakeholders (citizens, NGOs, etc.) in
decision-making by means of community(-based) or participatory planning and
interactive decision-making (Healey 1997, 2007; Leach and Pelkey 2001; Lowndes,
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Pratchett, and Stoker 2001; Edelenbos 2005; Nye, Tapsell, and Twigger-Ross 2011;
Edelenbos, Klok, and Tatenhove 2009; Edelenbos, Klijn, and Steijn 2010; Abbas et al.
2014). This tendency to underline the importance of stakeholder engagement in decision-
making processes is also visible in current approaches to climate change adaptation
(Maciejewski Scheer and H€oppner 2010; Pahl-Wostl 2006, 2007; Few, Brown, and
Tompkins 2007), adaptive or collaborative water management (Meijerink and Huitema
2010; Van Buuren 2013) and integrated flood risk management (Green 2002; Marshall,
Blackstock, and Dunglinson 2010; Lupo Stanghellini 2010; Thaler and Priest 2014;
Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2015).
Stakeholder engagement, as we use the term in this paper, means that any group or
individual who can affect, or is affected by, programmes, plans and projects is involved
in the decision-making process (Freeman 1984; Lupo Stanghellini 2010). In this view,
stakeholder engagement is a more focused approach than public participation, as it
underlines the deeper, more personalized stakes at hand in decision-making (Beierle
2002; Lupo Stanghellini 2010). Contrary to participation, moreover, it also includes those
cases in which the initiative does not originate from the government but from citizens and
other stakeholders themselves.
Important motives to involve stakeholders in decision-making in the field of flood risk
management are (1) gaining increased support by societal actors, (2) improvement of the
quality of decision-making by using their information and solutions, and (3) creating
democratic legitimacy and trust by bridging the perceived growing cleavage between
citizens and flood risk management agencies (cf. Leach and Pelkey 2001; Macpherson
1977; Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Green 2002; Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2015).
However, there are also concerns with stakeholder engagement in flood risk
management. Several authors mention barriers which make the above-mentioned motives
for involving stakeholders in decision-making in the field of flood risk management hard
to reach (e.g. Chess and Purcell 1999). Tseng and Penning-Rowsell (2012) mention not
only different types of barriers related to governmental institutions (lack of institutional
support, accountability problems and closed cultures), but also barriers regarding time,
power inequalities and stakeholder characteristics. Stakeholders also can experience
frustration when their input is not taken seriously and does not have effect and impact
(Monnikhof and Edelenbos 2001).
2.2. Stakeholder engagement: government- or stakeholder-induced?
In the literature there is increasing attention to stakeholder initiative, self-organization and
local self-responsibility of community groups (Thaler and Priest 2014; Thaler and Levin-
Keitel 2015). Room for stakeholder engagement may considerably reduce the
government’s abilities to directly control the governing process (Sørensen 2002, 99).
However, even then the government is indirectly ruling, as stakeholder engagement may
be highly steered and conditioned by public agencies (Abbas et al. 2014). They set the
basic objectives, and the rules (how to act; how to allocate burdens and benefits) and
structures (at what moments in policy-making) for citizen input. The right and opportunity
to be involved is not given; it must be continuously negotiated by contesting existing forms
of in- and exclusion based on political-administrative choices (Sørensen 2002, 704).
However, rather than fully operating within the restrictions of government-
organized participatory processes, citizens often organize themselves locally and take
the initiative for collective action (Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2015). In such self-
organized forms of stakeholder engagement, citizens, community groups, and social
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interest groups spontaneously engage in forms of collective action more independently
from, even if in reaction to, government-induced steering processes, structures or decisions,
plans and projects (Van Meerkerk et al. 2013). Local stakeholder engagement often arises
reactively, from dissatisfaction with the actions of governments, and functions as a
response to proposed government policies. Such forms of engagement crucially go beyond
plan resistance by focusing on the development of alternative plans and projects. This is
what is called stakeholder initiative in this paper. To avoid being blamed as NIMBY (Not
In My Back-Yard), citizens often develop alternatives for formal policy proposals.
Regarding flood risk management, this can imply that residents had to leave their land,
houses and property; instead of resisting this, citizens come up with ideas of their own, for
example, to heighten their properties (creating terps).
There is, thus, an important difference between public participation and government-
initiated forms of stakeholder engagement on one hand, and stakeholder initiatives on the
other. The former is controlled by the formal policy initiator and structured by rules set
by this initiator. It is restricted as far as the initiator deems necessary. The initiator also
defines the scope, moments and methods of participation. The latter, stakeholder
initiatives, springs from the self-organizing network of citizens and community groups
who aim to develop their own alternatives, plans and projects.
2.3. Analytical framework and research methodology
In this research, we are interested in describing and explaining the developments of
stakeholder initiatives in flood risk management projects in the Netherlands, and the
responses these initiatives evoke from governmental actors. On the basis of literature about
stakeholder involvement in water management and flood risk management, we expect that
the goals, resources and strategies stakeholders employ and the way governmental actors
respond explain the role and impact of stakeholder initiatives and plans on decision-
making regarding flood risk management. If the goal or strategy of stakeholders is to fight
governmental plans for flood risk management, the response by governmental actors is
supposed to be negative to stakeholder initiatives and results in lower impacts. If
stakeholders have the resources (time, knowledge, expertise, etc.) to develop their plans
and initiatives, governmental actors are supposed to be more inclined to positively respond
to stakeholder initiatives. This will, in the end, increase the possibility of policy impact.
These expectations and considerations lead to the following variables that form the
core of our analytical framework for this exploratory comparative case study:
(1) Goals of local groups: the ambitions of the local groups and the values they want
to protect with their initiative;
(2) Resources of the local groups: which resources do they mobilize and apply?
Resources can be (internal and external) networks, time, money, experience,
knowledge and expertise, professional tools (ICT, press releases), norms and
values, and material resources like land and other property.
Table 1. Overview of interviews conducted in research period.
Case
Terps plan in
Overdiep Polder
Dyke relocation
in Lent
Bypass
IJsseldelta-South
Interviews 27 25 15
Period included 20072012 20072011 20082011
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(3) Local stakeholder strategies: which strategy or strategies do they apply? These
strategies can vary between  for example  reactive (blocking, litigation) or
proactive resistance (by developing and selling own ideas).
(4) Governmental response: how do government actors respond to stakeholder
strategies? To what extent did the government include the local group in the
planning process, leading to processes of co-creation, co-production and
collaboration?
(5) Impact: To what extent did the stakeholder initiative influence the course of
events (process) and the content (scope, alternatives analysed, etc.) of the
planning process (Edelenbos, Klok, and Tatenhove 2009; Klijn, Edelenbos, and
Steijn 2010)? To what degree are the results from the interactive process
translated into (new) policy (Knott and Wildavsky 1980; Koontz 2005;
Monnikhof and Edelenbos 2001).
We conducted a qualitative comparative case study research to explain the role and
impact of stakeholder initiatives in flood risk management. This research strategy
explicitly focuses on comparing cases to find contextual and situational similarities and
differences that can be used for explaining the variance in the dependent variable: the
impact of a stakeholder initiative on governmental policy (i.e. impact). We used a
combination of an instrumental and conventional comparative case study method (cf.
Stake 1998; Yin 1984). We used an instrumental case study approach as we want to find
out more about a particular phenomenon, stakeholder initiatives. We explicitly use a
conventional case study strategy as our ambition is to gain insights from this case
comparison, which, in turn, may result in further theoretical reflection on stakeholder
initiatives in flood risk management.
We conducted the comparative case study research in a focused way structured by the
five variables mentioned and operationalized above, to empirically analyse and explain a
particular theoretically relevant issue (role and impact of stakeholder initiatives in flood
risk management) and generate new insights. This type of research does not (and cannot)
yield generalizable knowledge about local stakeholder initiatives, but it does provide a
detailed and contextualized understanding of how local stakeholders employ their
involvement and strategies in flood risk management projects and how governmental
actors respond to these strategies.
We have deliberately selected three cases for this qualitative comparative case study
research: (1) dyke relocation in Lent, (2) bypass construction in IJsseldelta-South, and (3)
a ‘terps’ (mounds) plan in the Overdiep Polder. These three cases have some core
similarities that make case comparison feasible. All cases deal with realizing measures to
improve safety from river floods caused by anticipated climate change in the
Netherlands. Moreover, all three cases deal explicitly with stakeholder initiatives, in
which citizens and societal organizations jointly developed their own plans next to
governmental plans for flood risk management.
Two case studies (Lent and IJsseldelta-South) were part of a larger study of adaptive
water management in the Netherlands, in which citizen engagement was central (Van
Buuren, Edelenbos, and Klijn 2010). The third case study, the Overdiep Polder, is based
upon an analysis of primary documents and interviews by two of the current authors (see
also Winnubst 2011; Roth and Winnubst 2009, 2010, 2014).
The cases also show contextual differences regarding the strategy, resources, and
goals of initiators and governmental responses to stakeholder initiatives. Moreover, the
cases differ in the dependent impact, the impact of stakeholders on decision-making
regarding flood risk management. These differences were not fleshed out beforehand, but
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 51
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
4:3
1 2
4 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
were analysed in more detail during the case comparative research. It is important for
comparative case study research that cases have enough differences, in order to gain
explanatory power in the comparative analysis.
In all cases, in-depth, semi-structured and open-ended interviews were held. In
all cases we interviewed various stakeholders, such as representatives of the Room
for the River programme, farmers, citizen organizations, municipalities, province repre-
sentatives, national departments, and nature conservation organizations (see overview in
table 1). Some people (for example chair of local interest group, project manager from
municipality) were interviewed several times because of their pivotal role in the projects.
All interviews were elaborated in transcripts. The transcripts were coded, in which the
operationalized core variables were used as main codes. First, the data were analysed per
case. The researchers discussed the data per case in different rounds to gain common
understanding about the core variables in the study. Second, the data were compared
between the three cases. Again, all researchers discussed the similarities and differences
between the cases in different rounds of discussion in order to reach common ground.
3. Case descriptions and analyses
In this section, we first provide background information on the three cases (paragraph
3.1). Second, we analyse the three cases on the variables distinguished and elaborated in
the theoretical framework (paragraph 3.2).
3.1. Introduction of the three cases
Despite the general ‘poldering tradition’ in the Netherlands, Dutch water management for
a long time has been characterized by centralization and top down interference by the
central agency Rijkswaterstaat (Van Buuren, Edelenbos, and Klijn 2010). However, more
recently, in the Dutch water management and flood risk management sector there has
been a cautious transition from quite top-down and expert-led decision-making to
network coordination and stakeholder approaches. This is, for a large part, caused by the
professionalization of interest groups and the emancipation and activation of citizens. In
this transition not only stakeholder participation took a flight, but rather recently we also
witnessed new ways of stakeholder engagement, i.e. stakeholder initiatives or self-
organization (Van Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012). This is the changing Dutch
context of flood risk management in which the three studied cases took place. The first
case, the terps plan in the Overdiep Polder, is about enlarging discharge capacity in the
River Bergsche Maas. The Overdiep polder (550 ha) is hemmed in between the Oude
Maasje and the Bergsche Maas (see Figure 1). Confronted with government plans for
using the polder for flood storage, the inhabitants of the polder (around 19 households,
almost all dairy farmers) developed their own proposal, in cooperation with a water
expert. To avoid a long, uncertain planning process the farmers decided to take the
initiative. In their proposal for the polder, the idea was developed to make the polder
suitable for flood storage (once in 25 years on average), in a way that would meet the
Room for the River goals and requirements of lowering of the water level and
enhancement of spatial quality. To make this possible, the dyke along the river Bergsche
Maas was to be lowered to let the water in when needed. To make the area keep its
agricultural functions, mounds (or ‘terps’) were to be constructed and part of the farms
and related property were to be rebuilt on them. The farmers did not approve alternatives
such as a dyke bisecting the polder and transformation of the polder into a nature area.
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The first alternative did not meet the requirements for lowering the water in the river
Meuse (and therefore was not acceptable to the government either), while the latter
alternative could not be combined with the agricultural function of the polder (see Roth
and Winnubst 2014). The total number of farming households in the polder had to be
reduced from 17 to around 8, ideally by voluntary sales resulting from farmers’ decisions
to leave the polder. An additional objective was strengthening the agricultural enterprises
remaining in the polder.
Technically the plans for the polder were not very complex, mainly requiring
adaptation of the existing infrastructure (dykes, roads) to make water storage possible.
What complicated the plans is the decision, based on the inhabitants’ initiatives, to
combine the polder’s ‘blue’ functions with pre-existing uses and functions of the polder,
which basically required a serious and ongoing process of negotiation with the
inhabitants about key issues like landownership, compensation, and reallocation of land
(see Roth and Winnubst 2010, 2014).
The second case is the dyke relocation in Lent (see Figure 2). Lent was considered a
bottleneck in the river system, as the River Waal between the city of Nijmegen and Lent
is very narrow. The municipality of Nijmegen was surprised by the plan for a dyke
relocation initiated by the national government (Department of Infrastructure and Water
Management), because the city had already been given approval by the national
government (Ministry of Housing) for a housing project in exactly the same area. In
2002, Nijmegen and the national government signed agreements for a contribution to the
costs of a second bridge across the River Waal and compensation for redeveloping the
local government’s plan for housing. These agreements were based on a preference for
the plan for a dyke relocation (350 meters inland into the village of Lent). For the
proposed dyke relocation fifty houses had to be demolished, which caused much local
resistance. The citizens’ alternative, aiming at a dyke relocation in the future, was not
approved for cost and efficiency reasons.
The third case, the Bypass IJsseldelta South, is located in the area between the city of
Kampen, the River IJssel en the Drontermeer (Dronten lake) in the Province of Overijssel
(see Figure 3). The goal of this project is the improvement of water safety, spatial quality,
and infrastructure. Moreover, the project should strengthen the agricultural sector. Thus,
it is also a regional development project. The Department of Infrastructure and Water
Figure 1. Terps plan in Overdiep Polder, the Netherlands.
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Management developed a plan to enlarge the flood plains in nearby Kampen. Both
province and municipality, however, were not happy with this plan and asked permission
to develop an alternative plan that would also result in improved water safety and spatial
quality. The national government decided to give province and municipality the
opportunity to devise a new and better plan in two years (20072009) which resulted in a
plan for constructing a bypass in the river IJssel towards Lake Dronten. The plan consists
of ideas for nature development, infrastructure development (road and rail infrastructure),
water recreation, and housing near the bypass.
To conclude our introduction of the three cases, we provide an overview of all the
stakeholders involved in three cases in Table 2.
3.2. Analysis of the nature of local stakeholder engagement in the three cases
In this section, we systematically analyse the nature of stakeholder engagement in the
three cases. We treat subsequently the following aspects: (1) goals of local actors
involved in the cases; (2) their resources; (3) the strategies the local stakeholders develop
and implement; (4) the responses of governmental actors to these strategies; and (5) the
impact of stakeholder initiatives.
3.2.1. Goals of local stakeholders
3.2.1.1. Terps plan in Overdiep Polder. After an information meeting in May 2000
about government plans for water storage in the polder, four farmers invited a provincial
delegate and asked him to be given the opportunity to develop their own alternative plan
for combining living, agriculture and dairy farming with water storage during peak water
periods. Farmers’ organization ZLTO and the Province of Noord-Brabant supported the
Figure 2. Dyke relocation in Lent, the Netherlands.
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farmers in developing their plan. The inhabitants organized into the Overdiep Farmers’
Association, which represented them in their negotiations with governmental actors. As
only a proportion of the original inhabitants could stay in the polder, several families
would have to move out. Fearing slow procedures, long-lasting uncertainty about the
cost-effectiveness of investments and endless delays, most inhabitants shared the wish
not to become dependent on externally (government-) developed plans for their polder.
As project planning moved on, rifts between the inhabitants (the plausible ‘stayers’ and
‘leavers’ became manifest and increasingly influenced both the planning process, the
coherence of the Overdiep Farmers’ Association, and the relationships between the
farmers.
3.2.1.2. Dyke relocation in Lent. In the Dyke relocation in Lent case, diverse citizen
groups were involved. In reaction to the governmental plan for dyke relocation, several
local groups were formed. These can be divided into (1) ‘leavers’ (those that have to
Figure 3. Bypass IJsseldelta South, the Netherlands.
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leave their properties for the dyke relocation), (2) ‘watchers’ (those who get a new dyke
in their front yards), and (3) ‘stayers’ (those who can stay living on the new island). In
addition, there were two other local bodies, the village council and an environmental
group. The common aim of all these actors was to get the dyke relocation off the table.
3.2.1.3. Bypass IJsseldelta South. In this case, various local stakeholder groups were
engaged. First, one can distinguish farmers. While the area to be redeveloped for the
bypass mainly influences agricultural land, the farmers want conservation of the
agricultural area. As the area is also full of environmental and green resources, several
environmental and nature organizations are present in the project. They join hands in
organizing protests against plan development by governmental parties (‘Bye Bye
Bypass’). In addition, a pressure group (‘Zwartendijk’) was formed, consisting of local
citizens, which aims especially at keeping one cultural historical location free from
human activity. Finally, there was an association of citizens, which resists the idea of
positioning the bypass in the area in such a way that it would split the two communities
of Kamperveen and Noordeinde into two.
3.2.2. The resources of the local stakeholders
3.2.2.1. Terps plan in Overdiep Polder. Knowledge was a crucial resource throughout
the planning process. Farmers commanded important knowledge about their polder and
many other relevant aspects. Other important resources commanded by the inhabitants
were their land and related farm property, the initially high social cohesion and
community identity, and relatively similar interests in the continuity of dairy farming.
Some of the leading farmers were involved and experienced in local politics, and could
Table 2. Which local stakeholders are involved in the projects?
Cases actors Dyke relocation Lent Overdiepse Polder
Bypass IJsseldelta
Kampen
Citizen groups Very active; resistance
against the breaking
down of houses.
Various local
community groups,
individual residents
Inhabitants are mostly
farmers. United in
one interest group.
Very active in
‘determining their
own future’
Very active; a number
of organized groups,
local community
groups and protest
groups
Farmers Not present in this case Individual farmers
united in the
Overdiep Farmers’
Association
Present (both
individual and
organized) in the
regional farmer
organization
Environmental
groups
A few; with focus on
cultural heritage,
and nature
Not present Very active; many
forms of organized
and coordinated
action
Others University of Delft; a
professor with ideas
for alternatives for
the development of
the area
Habiforum
(knowledge
institute) Province
of Brabant, Steering
Committee Rivers

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easily plug in to provincial political networks. Knowledge institute Habiforum provided
expertise to design the terps plan. The two main representatives of the farmers were very
skilled in presenting their plan to the outside world, thus creating a growing
governmental interest in ‘success’ of the project.
3.2.2.2. Dyke relocation in Lent. In this case, the local groups developed an alternative
to the dyke relocation and invested in lobbying activities towards media, members of the
city council of Nijmegen and the national parliament. Three local groups cooperated and
formed the Lent Federation (Lentse Federatie). Depending on the issue at stake, the other
local groups collaborated with the Lent Federation.
Lent Federation had contacts with an emeritus professor of Water Management at
Delft University of Technology, who helped the federation in developing its alternative
plan. With the help of the city of Nijmegen the citizens’ plan was designed as a full
alternative in the environmental assessment studies.
3.2.2.3. Bypass IJsseldelta-South. The various stakeholder groups in this case did have
very good relations with local and regional media, but also with politicians at various
levels. As a result, they managed to get attention in the media. They were also active in
sending press releases and presenting themselves on the internet. Furthermore, the
various interest groups were able to mobilize their own local networks. Due to strong
community ties the interest groups were successful in mobilizing support. Existing
relations with politicians were used to strengthen the impact of the stakeholder groups’
actions on the planning process.
The interest groups were well equipped to conduct and mobilize counter-expertise,
which questioned the expertise as presented by the project initiators.
3.2.3. The strategies of the local stakeholders
3.2.3.1. Terps plan in the Overdiep Polder. As responsible authority for plan
development, the province was in charge of the negotiations with the farmers, including
general aspects of the plan, like compensation issues. The farmers managed to bring in
their alternative ideas. Because there was a strong pressure on the (national and
provincial) government to make this showcase project a ‘success’, the farmers,
represented by the Overdiep Farmers’ Association, had a relatively strong negotiating
position in the planning process. They got help from a professional independent process
manager who was also very capable in managing media attention.
However, during the planning process the farmers’ group gradually changed into an
interest group for ‘stayers’. Hence, in the course of the process the ‘leavers’ did not have
a platform representing their interests. Moreover, the farmers’ strategy gradually
changed. Depending on their personal and household situation, farmers opted for the best
possible solution, whether to start a new farming enterprise in the polder, or elsewhere, or
to stop farming altogether. As a result, the farmers’ community partly fell apart, because
farmers left their collaborative strategy and opted for a go-alone strategy.
3.2.3.2. Dyke relocation in Lent. The government plan to relocate the dyke 350 meters
inland and to demolish 50 houses caused much resistance among the inhabitants. Their
first reaction was to invest positive energy in developing an alternative, rather than
negative energy in procedural blocking. They estimated that NIMBY-behaviour would
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not be a successful strategy, because the government will win in the end. In 2002, the
local group developed an alternative, Lentse Warande, in response to the government
plan. The Delft emeritus professor (see above) provided the professional support for their
plan. The citizens’ alternative would make dyke relocation and the demolition of
dwellings superfluous.
The plan was included in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure, as
an alternative to the government plan. The local groups got the opportunity to represent
citizen interests in the advisory board that was part of the project organization for
conducting the EIA studies. Although the advisory board could advise the steering group
in decision-making issues, their advice was not binding.
In the participation procedure of the EIA more than 500 written ‘viewpoints’ were
submitted in support of Lentse Warande, but this did not change the government’s
decision. After the EIA, the project had to follow the national procedure for Room for the
River, which includes the possibility for citizens to file complaints and give suggestions.
In total, 300 letters have been written. In reaction, the permanent committee for
Infrastructure and Water Management in parliament invited representatives of the Lent
Federation to hear their thoughts on this issue.
3.2.3.3. Bypass IJsseldelta-South. Local stakeholders became engaged after the
internal development and assessment of five alternatives by civil servants of Overijssel
Province. The Association Kamperveen’s developed a sixth scenario with a blue function
(water for recreation) for the bypass, planned closer to the city of Kampen. The province
explicitly invited them to come up with their own ideas, and offered assistance by civil
servants from the project organization. This co-production led to a plan implying that the
location of the bypass was shifted towards the city of Kampen. This new plan fitted well
with the ideas of the province to develop a new residential area in the rural area of
Kampen. However, farmer organization LTO, the Water Board and environmental
organizations had serious doubts about this new development and preferred a ‘less blue’
bypass, because the blue option hampers conservation of agricultural land and nature.
Since then, especially, the working group Zwartendijk became active. The group
Zwartendijk consisted of many highly educated residents who were acknowledged to
challenge points of departure and information about demographic developments, growth
in the number of citizens, etc. The new location of the bypass now crossed green scenery,
which caused resistance from the societal group Zwartendijk. This group developed all
kinds of strategies to prevent redeveloping this location for the implementation of the
bypass. The group especially resisted the idea of developing a new housing location
crossing an area of natural beauty. It started with a petition campaign, signed by about
9,000 inhabitants of Kampen. Moreover, it used the strategy to communicate through
local and national television, local newspapers and radio.
3.2.4. Governmental responses
3.2.4.1. Terps plan in Overdiep Polder. Here the farmer initiative combined the
national objective of making room for the river with the local interest of strengthening
dairy farming. The terps plan will lower the water level during peak discharge in the river
Meuse with around 28 cm, which convinced the national government to support the plan.
The farmers insisted on getting their plan approved and playing a key role in the process.
As a consequence, they were included in the governmental working group, while their
58 J. Edelenbos et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
4:3
1 2
4 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
expert became an advisor of the executive board, a novelty in the history of water
management. Knowing their key position in the planning process, the farmers shared the
ownership of the terps plan with the provincial and national governments, as well as the
Water Board that is in charge of implementation. In the Overdiep case, receptivity on the
part of the provincial administration was high. However, the key decision-making role on
funding remained in the hands of the national government. Sometimes this caused tensions
between farmers and province, or between province and national government. These were
solved by negotiations, in which the farmers had a relatively strong position (see above).
3.2.4.2. Dyke relocation in Lent. At the beginning of the project, the city of Nijmegen
had signed agreements with the municipality and the national government about the
preferred option: dyke relocation. In return, Nijmegen was to get compensation for its
intended housing plan in the area where the dyke had to be moved inland. Nijmegen also
negotiated national funding (90 million Euro) for a bridge across the River Waal in order
to solve congestion problems with the existing bridge. While the alderman of Nijmegen
supported the government plan, the city council supported the citizens’ alternative. This
led to a political schism that also influenced the steering group of the EIA organization.
The national government presented acceptance of the government dyke relocation plan as
a precondition for government funding of the new city bridge. This further diminished
the manoeuvring space for the alderman and made the citizens feel they were not part of
the decision-making and were not taken seriously.
However, under political pressure, the aldermen of the municipality decided to
involve the citizens in the planning process. They were invited to join a group of
stakeholders that could provide non-binding advice. This group advised involving the
plan Lentse Warande in the EIA. Finally, the municipality agreed, leading to more
co-production between the civil servants and citizens in making their plan ‘procedurally
and substantially fit’ for this assessment, not to really integrate the diversity of ambitions
and interests of citizens and the municipality.
3.2.4.3. Bypass IJsseldelta-South. As indicated, in a temporary but very productive
co-production between citizens and officials a sixth scenario was developed, satisfying
the interests of the communities of Kamperveen and Oosteind. Then, in reaction to the
relocation plans for the bypass, the Working Group Zwartendijk emerged and joined
the sounding board group (a group of stakeholders that could provide reflections and
recommendations (advice) to the authorities). However, this group seldom met and
played no significant role.
Meanwhile, civil servants that chaired the sounding board in the project group
experienced the interaction and communication of actors, mainly of the working group
Zwartendijk, as less cooperative. These stakeholders were mobilizing the media to express
their arguments and interests. Feeling pressurized by the media and politics to incorporate
input and information provided by the working group, the province changed its short-term
plans while keeping options open until new information and arguments would come to
hand to support the plans for building along the bypass and in the rural area.
3.2.5. Impact
3.2.5.1. Terps plan in the Overdiep Polder. The impact of the citizens’ strategies in the
terps plan in the Overdiep Polder case can be considered high, as the terps plan was
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positively received by most inhabitants of the polder and by the other actors involved, and
adopted. It took a couple of years after its introduction before the terps plan was accepted
and adopted by the governmental working group. The citizen initiative developed into a
process of co-creation in which representatives of the government (local, regional and
national) collaborated with local stakeholders, a relationship characterized by periods of
cooperation and of conflict. In the end, the terps plan initiated by the inhabitants of the
polder became adopted in the governmental implementation strategy.
3.2.5.2. Dyke relocation in Lent. The impact of the citizens’ strategies in the Dyke
relocation in Lent case can be considered ‘procedural impact’ as the citizen’s plan, the
Lentse Warande, was included in the EIA procedure. In this EIA, the Lentse Warande
was considered best in its short-term effects. However, the citizens’ plan was scoring less
positive in long-term climate effects as they were less focused on future climate impacts
and considered less the consequences of these impacts for the need for change. For
mainly this reason the option of dyke relocation was favoured and the citizens’ option
was dropped. The citizens fought the outcome even up to the national government, but in
the end the dyke relocation option was chosen, after which citizen resistance and
engagement extinguished.
3.2.5.3. Bypass IJsseldelta South. The impact of the citizens’ strategies in the Bypass
IJsseldelta South case can be characterized as temporarily delaying decision-making.
Mainly by their diverse set of strategies (media attention, lobbying at local, regional and
national government levels, and discussion and participation in the sounding board), the
working group Zwartendijk succeeded in reducing the ambition level of the housing plan
in the area. In 2011, provincial executives decided to be lenient with the green scenery of
Zwartendijk until 2020. However, the formal decision to realize the bypass was taken at
the end of 2012. When the authorities started the implementation (in 2015), the working
group went to the High Court. The High Court decided that the underpinning of the
bypass was insufficient. At the moment, the High Court still has to decide whether the
supplementary information is good enough to go forward with realizing the bypass.
4. Discussion
In this section, we compare and discuss the empirical case study results from Section 3.
We discuss similarities and differences between the cases regarding the main
distinguished variables (goals, resources, strategies, governmental responses and impact),
and critically reflect upon their impact. We also position the insights gained in current
literature and scholarly debate on stakeholder engagement in flood risk management.
The first insight from comparative case analysis is that, in all three cases, various local
stakeholders with different (organizational) backgrounds were engaged in the flood risk
management projects discussed, found each other in developing their own goals (parallel
to the governmental plans), and managed to mobilize all kind of resources to assist them
in the formulation and realization of their goals and initiatives. The organized local
groups not only used resources like knowledge and information, but also social networks
and collaborations with knowledge organizations and technical experts. The local groups
were well-prepared and devoted much time to mobilizing supportive resources to make
their plans and initiatives more substantially sound and convince governmental agencies.
The media were often used in airing their complaints about the governmental flood risk
management plans and getting exposure for their plans. Other scholars also stress this
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observation. Thaler and Levin-Keitel (2015) especially stress the local capacity to act,
such as knowledge, time, financial, social and cultural capital. This local capital and
capacity is needed to ensure that the interests of local stakeholders are represented in
flood risk management (see also Kruse and Seidl 2013). This capital and capacity is
crucial for realizing impact, as we discuss below.
The second main insight from our comparative analysis is the plurality of strategies
used by the different stakeholders in the cases. Other studies also indicate that strong
bottom-up community processes are accompanied by strong local leadership and active
lobbying to force government authorities to co-operate with (local) stakeholders (Thaler
and Levin-Keitel 2015). However, our study also reveals that local stakeholder are not
just about resisting governmental plans, but they are also much more about developing
alternative plans and initiatives to substantiate their voices and create legitimacy and
acceptance of their role in the planning process. It is striking to see that, in all three cases,
local stakeholders complemented or combined their defensive strategies with more
constructive strategies in which they developed alternative plans that better represented
their ideas, interests and values than the governmental plans. Moreover, stakeholders
were actively exploiting their networks in order to expose and realize their plans,
including informing the media at crucial moments, getting support from governmental
bodies, elected officials and politicians (lobbying).
The third insight is that although stakeholder initiatives in the three cases share many
similar conditions (like the formal planning procedure as a context, the resistance against
the initial public proposal as main driver), they differ considerably in their impact on
decision-making about flood risk management plans. In only one case (Overdiep), the
impact on decision-making is high because the adopted plan is a farmers’ initiative with a
central role for the residents in the planning process. In the other two cases the impact is
low. In the case of Kampen, the impact amounts to a much smaller building programme
and delay in the implementation, but the overall decision for the governmental plan is
taken at the end of 2012. In 2015, the stakeholders were successful in mobilizing the
High Court against the implementation of the plan, but it is questionable whether this will
lead to its definitive liquidation. In the case of Lent, we see that the impact is purely
procedural; the stakeholders’ plan was incorporated into the formal procedure (EIA), but
with no real influence on decision-making.
How can this difference in impact of stakeholder initiatives on decision-making be
explained? Two aspects, already touched upon in the beginning of this section, are very
important: empowerment and local capacity. These are also recognized by other scholars
(Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2015; Kruse and Seidl 2013; Kuhlicke et al. 2011) as important
assets for local stakeholders, to make sure that governmental bodies cannot ignore their
interests and plans and at least have to reconsider their flood risk management strategies.
However, as local capacity was found to be present in all three cases, this is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for generating impact. Other conditions have thus to be
distilled to explain impact.
We found that timing and co-creation are important conditions for developing
stakeholder initiatives with impact. In the case of IJsseldelta South, the municipality had
the time (in the initial project phases) to integrate the input of local stakeholders into its
plan. However, the revision of the plan led to a relocation of the bypass, causing other
stakeholders to become active but at the same time implying less time and space for their
voice and input. In the case of the dyke relocation in Lent, local input could be integrated
in the EIA studies, although local and national governments agreed on compensation
measures which locked decision-making on the governmental plan. The timing of the input
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by stakeholders can be considered bad but they could not be blamed for this, because local,
regional and national governments had already made deals behind the scenes, which made
input from other stakeholders difficult. In the case of the Overdiep Polder, the timing of the
initiative was better, as governmental plans had not been developed yet and provincial
officials were receptive to inputs from local stakeholders. This barrier of timing is also
recognized in other studies of stakeholder and public participation (Chess and Purcell
1999). Stakeholders are often only engaged at the later stages of interventions, and this
negatively influences the chances for stakeholders to be involved in decision-making itself
(Tseng and Penning-Rowsell 2012, 256): decisions have already been taken and therefore
the momentum for having real influence and impact has passed.
Moreover, the nature of the governmental response is important for the chances of
impact of stakeholder initiatives. In the case of the Overdiep Polder, a positive response
and receptivity to stakeholder initiative was present, evolving into a process of co-
creation in which citizens and representatives of lower-level governmental agencies
collaboratively worked towards acceptable solutions for flood risk management and
spatial planning. This government response was partly present in the case of the bypass in
Kampen. The provincial government was initially receptive to community plans, but in a
later stage of the process this receptivity and positive response declined as the
governmental agency wanted to speed up the process. In the case of the dyke relocation
in Lent, we see that a process of co-creation was lacking, as the municipal government
did not really have the intention to make the stakeholder initiative a serious ‘competitor’
for the governmental plan. This factor of institutional susceptibility to bottom-up
initiatives is found to be very important for the impact of stakeholder initiatives in
developing and implementing flood risk management strategies. In other studies this is
discussed in terms of relationships and tensions with existing governmental institutions
(Tseng and Penning-Rowsell 2012; Edelenbos, Klok, and Tatenhove 2009). Governments
do not always approach stakeholder engagement and initiatives in an open and receptive
way, but often feel threatened by them, as they could imply ‘hollowing out the state’
(Edelenbos 2005). Some authors emphasize the political side: introduction of stakeholder
engagement in flood risk management has consequences for existing power relations.
Some governmental institutions resist this power sharing (Warner 2006, 2011), which
causes barriers to integrating local knowledge into their plans (Tseng and Penning-
Rowsell 2012, 257). Especially for the rather closed and expert-oriented Dutch flood risk
management domain it is difficult to enlarge its openness to outsider initiatives.
5. Conclusions
This paper has explored the ways in which stakeholders develop alternative flood risk
management strategies in the Netherlands. We draw four main conclusions regarding the
nature of stakeholder initiatives and the relationship with impact.
First, we can draw the conclusion that in flood risk management, a sector in the
Netherlands (but also in other countries) which is heavily dominated by governmental
agencies and technical expertise, stakeholder initiatives arise beyond the direct control of
government (see also: Lupo Stanghellini 2010). We see that a ‘wisdom of the crowds’
(Surowiecki 2004) evolves, in which local stakeholders team up with their professional
relations (architects, planners, scientists, social community members, etc.) and develop
their own plans through a process of self-organization in which they mobilize a wide
range of resources and capacities, like media attention, expertise, network relations,
finance, etc. (see also Thaler and Priest 2014; Kuhlicke et al. 2011; Kruse and Seidl
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2013). Local stakeholders show adaptive behaviour in turning their defensive strategies into
proactive and productive ones by developing their own alternatives and solutions. This
conclusion matches with observations made by other scholars in the field of climate
change and flood risk management (cf. Nye, Tapsell, and Twigger-Ross 2011; Thaler and
Levin-Keitel 2015). Our study, however, adds some meaningful insights to this emergence
of stakeholder initiatives by relating this changing role of local stakeholders to the impact
of stakeholder initiatives on decision-making about flood risk management measures.
Second, our study shows that local stakeholders use a mix of strategies and resources
(media attention, lobbying, constructing own plans, using their networks, etc.) to
organize impact. Our study indicates that the exact mix of these strategies helps to
explain the impact of the alternative plans developed by local stakeholders. A
combination of positive (generating expertise) and negative lobbying (media attention),
as well as anchoring the initiative within the formal planning and flood risk management
process, seemed to be quite successful. Self-organized initiatives can gain recognition by
pressuring (for example political lobbying and exposure in the media). However, too
much negative lobbying or too much emphasis on airing complaints about governmental
actions may become a negative asset, as we saw in the IJsseldelta case, as governments
can become even more defensive and opposed to bottom-up initiatives than they tend to
be. From our study, we can also learn that stakeholder initiatives that are compatible with
the public goals are much easier to realize, compared to initiatives which are aimed to
oppose the proposed public goals.
Third, another explanation for the impact of stakeholder initiatives is that it is
important for the viability and impact of self-organization in flood risk management that
it is connected as rapidly and effectively as possible to governmental decision-making.
This possible connection depends on how government responds to self-organization in
flood risk management. This is also stressed in other literature on participation and self-
organization (Edelenbos, van Schie and Gerrits 2010; Margerum 2011; Edelenbos 2005;
Feldman and Khademian 2007; Tseng and Penning-Rowsell 2012). However, we can add
to this insight that a positive attitude and response from governmental agencies to
stakeholder initiatives may contribute to the explanation of the impact of these initiatives.
As our comparative analysis shows, the impact of stakeholder initiatives on decision-
making increases when governmental agents are more open and responsive to local
stakeholder initiatives. This is also influenced by the mix of strategies through which the
initiative is launched (see the first conclusion). A positive response followed up by a
process of co-creation in which local stakeholders and governmental agencies join hands
in further developing the stakeholder plan increases the chance of impact on decision-
making, as the stakeholder initiative gets broader attention, elaboration and support. To
secure impact it is important to combine stakeholder knowledge with professional and
bureaucratic knowledge, with the possibility that this results in co-produced plans for
flood risk management. However, this can also lead to a trade-off: the initiative by the
stakeholders may disappear in the co-creation with governmental agencies as these
agencies and their rules and procedures might become too dominant and take over the
initiative (Edelenbos, Klok, and Tatenhove 2009).
Finally, the timing of the stakeholder initiative in the process of flood risk
management influences the role and impact of stakeholder initiatives in the three cases.
As has been shown above, some substantial promising initiatives came at a bad moment
(too late), for example when governmental agencies had already predetermined the
preferred measure for flood risk management. Timing and finding the right people in
governmental agencies turn out to be crucial factors for generating support for local
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stakeholder initiatives in flood risk management. Timing is important as this determines
the level of receptivity of governmental actors to local stakeholder initiatives. However,
the response also depends on the extent to which the governmental actor really values the
input of local stakeholders and is willing to create openings in the decision-making
process to incorporate this input.
Flood risk management becomes more and more confronted with stakeholder
initiatives (Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2015; Heltberg, Gitay, and Prabhu 2012; Rinaudo
and Garin 2005; Petts and Brooks 2006; Sabatier et al. 2005). Hence, effective and
legitimate flood risk strategies increasingly result from local stakeholder initiatives and
the interplay of the strategies of local stakeholders and governmental actors. However,
this interplay does not emerge spontaneously, and needs careful timing, negotiation and
co-creation (Margerum 2011) facing complexity in planning and flood risk management
in a productive way (Innes and Booher 2010). Especially from authorities in the flood
risk management domain, a more adaptive and receptive stance towards local stakeholder
initiatives seems to be necessary to realize flood risk management measures that are not
only effective, but also legitimate by doing justice to local values, priorities and interests.
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